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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(h) (2008) and
Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
L

Where the parties entered into a Stipulation in the course of the trial which

disposed of the Petitioner's property claim as to the value of the medical practice (hereafter the
M.D.P.C.) was it necessary for the Court to make any further Ruling regarding the character of
that asset? This is a question concerning the "considerable discretion" of the Court in
determining property distribution and is subject to a "clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion"
standard of review. Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, 993 P.2d 887.
II.

Did the Court err in determining that Dr. Keiter's earned income during the course

of the marriage and assets acquired therewith constitute marital assets? The standard of review is
a "clearly erroneous" standard. Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1316 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
III.

Did the Court err in finding as a matter of fact that the Snow Basin property is a

marital asset where:
A.

The contract for the purchase of the property was entered into between the
seller and the Respondent's retirement pension plan, a different and
distinct entity with multiple plan participants; and,

B.

The majority of the installment payments made pursuant to the purchase
contract were made during the marriage from the contributions of marital
earnings to the plan; and,

6

C.

The Respondent acquired title to the property from the pension plan during
the course of the marriage? The standard of review is a "clearly erroneous"
standard and the trial court actions enjoy a presumption of validity. Elman
v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83 117, 45 p3d 176.

IV.

Whether the Petitioner acquired an equitable interest in the Snow Basin property,

insofar as she acquired an equitable property interest in the defined benefit retirement pension
plan that owned it, pursuant to the Woodward case and formula? The standard of review is a
"clearly erroneous" standard. Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1316 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
V.

Whether, and if, the Snow Basin property is deemed the Respondent's separate

asset notwithstanding the above, did the property subsequently lose its identity due to the
Respondent's contributions and the contribution of marital earned income? The standard of
review is a "clearly erroneous" standard and the trial court actions enjoy a presumption of
validity. Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83 f 17, 45 p3d 176.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances or rules that are determinative
of these issues.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Nature of the Case
This appeal questions the 48 page Memorandum Decision of the trial Court which
constituted the Court's Findings of Fact. (Attached as Appellee's Addendum "'A"). In essence,
the Court ruled that it was unnecessary to decide the marital character of the Respondent's
M.D.P.C. in light of the parties' Stipulation. Mrs. Keiter had raised the question of the fair
7

market value of the M.D.P.C. for purposes of equitable property division. The parties'
Stipulation would allow Ms. Keiter to share in any proceeds from the sale of the M.D.P.C. The
Court accepted the Stipulation. The value of the M.D.P.C, and the questions of its character, are
separate and apart from the character of Dr. Keiter's marital earned income and the disposition of
that income. Dr. Keiter attempts to equate the two questions (i.e. the value and character of his
M.D.P.C. and the character of his marital earned income). The Court ruled that Dr. Keiter's
earned income and assets acquired therewith are clearly marital assets. Dr. Keiter's income was
earned in exchange for his efforts expended during the course of the marriage.
The trial judge ruled that the Snow Basin property was marital. This property was
purchased by a separate entity which is not a party to the divorce, to wit: the Respondent's
retirement pension plan. The contract to purchase the property was in the name of the plan. The
contract was executed September 18, 1981, approximately four months prior to the parties'
marriage. (See Pet. Ex. 39, Addendum "B"). It was not mentioned as an asset in Dr. Keiter's
prior divorce which was granted less than one month prior to the parties' marriage. The evidence
demonstrated that the retirement pension plan performed the terms of the purchase as called for
in the contract. This required annual installment payments and a final balloon payment which
were made during the course of the marriage from Dr. Keiter's contributions of marital earnings
to the plan. The retirement plan lacked liquidity and means to prepay the contract.
After 12 years of marriage the defined benefit pension retirement plan was terminated and
assets were distributed to the several participants in the plan including Dr. Keiter. At that time
the Snow Basin property was conveyed to Dr. Keiter. The taxes and penalty which resulted from
that distribution were paid by marital assets (Dr. Keiter's earned income) as were subsequent
8

obligations and expenses incurred to maintain and improve the property. Ms. Keiter participated
in all of the decision making regarding the distribution of the Snow Basin property., its
improvement, its expected, ultimate use and contributed to its improvement and maintenance and
augmented its value all during the marriage after it was conveyed to Dr. Keiter.
The appeal is in error in two fundamental respects: 1) Dr. Keiter and the retirement
pension plan are not one and the same, and, 2) The majority of the funds used to acquire the
property came from marital, earned income.
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial
The Petitioner accepts the Appellant's statement of the course of proceedings. The
Court's Memorandum Decision which constitutes its Findings of Fact are included in the
Addendum to the Appellee's Brief.
HI. Relevant Facts
1.

Dr. Keiter divorced his former spouse by a Decree dated the 11th day of January

1982. (R.494, Pet. Ex. 42, Addendum "C").
2.

The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce regarding Dr.

Keiter's prior divorce set forth Dr. Keiter's premarital property. (R. 494, Pet. Ex. 42 and 43,
Addendum "C" and UD").
3.

Dr. Keiter's final divorce papers dissolving his first marriage make no mention of

the Snow Basin property. However, they do refer to the value of the retirement pension plan.
(R.507, 639, p. 49).
4.

On the 19th day of September 1981 the M.D.P.C. defined benefit retirement

pension plan entered into a purchase contract to acquire the property referred to as the Snow
9

Basin property. That contract calls for installment payments to be made on an annual basis
together with a "balloon" payment ten years after the contract was executed. (R. 491, Pet. Ex. 39
or 40, Addendum "B" and "E").
5.

The retirement plan was not able to purchase the entirety of the 80 acres involved

and, therefore, found a "partner." The pension plan would, thereby, own a 5/8th interest in the
property. (R. 490-491, 639 p. 172-173).
6.

The purchase agreement called for a $2,500 earnest money and a down payment

of $34,500 and a total purchase price of $480,000. There could be periodic reconveyances (R.
639, p. 61-62) of the trust deed as the contract was performed. The contract called for ten annual
installments of $47,000 the principal to bear interest at 10%. The seller's interest was secured by
a trust deed. (R. 491, Pet. Ex. 39, 40 and 41, Addendum "B," "E" and "F").
7.

Title was initially conveyed to the partners not individually but as trustees of their

respective retirement plans. (R. 491, Pet. Ex. 41 and 51, Addendum "F" and "G").
8.

Annual payments were made as called for and divided between the parties with

the Keiter pension plan paying $29,375 per year (5/8ths of $47,000). (R. 492, 639, p. 235, Pet.
-Ex. 55, 56, 57, 87 and 105, Addendum "H," "I," "J," "K" and "L").
9.

A deed of reconveyance of the trust deed was recorded September 1992 after the

contract price was fully paid. At that time the partner, as trustee of his respective profit sharing
plan, quit claimed the 5/8ths share (50 acres) to the Keiter pension plan. (R. 492, 639, p. 176,
Res. Ex. 28 and Pet. Ex. 51, Addendum "M" and "G").
10.

The Court correctly identified a "dearth of records" which would conclusively

establish when the Keiter pension plan made the annual installment payments. Even though Dr.
10

Keiter claimed that he paid off the property before the marriage he could not carry his burden of
proof. (R. 493-494, 495-496, 497).
11.

The "scant evidence" conclusively demonstrates that at least one payment was

made during the marriage in 1987 and perhaps another one in 1988. The records which would
have established the Respondent's claim were solely under his control at all times. (R. 496, 499,
513-514).
12.

The value of the Keiter pension plan at the time of Dr. Keiter's divorce was

$187,000. If he had paid off the pension plan's portion of the purchase price by that time (the
trial was held December 1981) then the value of the pension plan would have to have been at
least $255,000. (R. 494). The $187,000 was not liquid funds available for a large down
payment, it was invested in other real estate by Dean Larsen. (R. 639 p. 49)
13.

Furthermore, if the Respondent's claim were correct there would have been no

call for the one installment payment in 1987 or the second one in 1988 in precisely the correct
amount. It is obvious that the Respondent did not pay off the entirety of the pension plan portion
of the purchase price and it is equally obvious that he did not make pre-payments. (R. 498).
14.

In addition, a September 30, 1988 bank statement, six years into the marriage,

shows a "'regular withdrawal" of $29,375 (the precise amount of the Respondent's annual
installment under the agreement). A handwritten note on the bank statement by the Respondent
shows it was uSnow Basin land contribution," This payment corresponded with the amount and
timing of the annual payment. (R. 496, Pet. Ex, 56, Addendum *WI").
15.

In addition, check number 5838 (Pet. Ex. 57, Addendum "J") drawn on the

M.D.P.C. business account number 8325, not the pension plan account, shows a $29,375
11

payment with the purpose being described as "Snow Basin land payment" payable to the seller,
Webber. This check was dated September 22, 1987, again corresponding with the annual
installment payment date and amount due under the contract. (R. 496).
16.

Petitioner's Exhibit 87 (Addendum UK") is a note which shows that as of

September 18, 1989 the Keiter defined benefit retirement plan as purchaser owed $187,507 and
that either the Respondent or the pension plan made two payments in June 1990. This note is
corroborated by Petitioner's Exhibit 105 (Addendum "L") which shows that the amortization
under the terms of the purchase contract in 1989 would show the Keiter pension share balance
due at $187,500. (R. 498).
17.

In 1994 the Keiter defined benefit pension plan was "replaced" with the 1994

retirement plan. At that time, there was some $1,005,886 in the plan. Clearly, the plan had
grown, in part due to marital contributions by the Respondent, during the course of the marriage.
The 1980 Keiter defined benefit retirement pension plan was terminated March 31, 1994. At that
time there were three participants. Distributions were made to a new plan called the John
Edward Keiter M.D.P.C. profit sharing plan (hereinafter the "profit sharing plan"). Coincident
with the termination of the Keiter pension plan and the establishment of the profit sharing plan
there was both a rollover of retirement assets and the distribution of assets, notably the Snow
Basin property. (R. 499).
18.

Based upon the advice of the Keiter's retirement plan attorney, Jay Curtis, and

following several meetings in which the Petitioner and the Respondent both participated, it was
determined that the Snow Basin property should be "distributed out" of the 1980 Keiter
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retirement pension plan at the time the plan was terminated. (R. 500, Pet. Ex. 93, Addendum
"N").
19.

Federal ERISA law required that the Snow Basin property, or any distribution

from the plan be transferred only to the named participant in the former plan, namely the
Respondent. Therefore, the property could not have been distributed and titled in the name of the
parties jointly. (R. 500, 640, p. 356-358, Pet. Ex. 103, Addendum u O").
20.

The federal ERISA law required that the Petitioner sign a waiver because she was

a spousal beneficiary under the 1980 plan and under federal law. (R. 500, Res. Ex. 12,
Addendum "P").
21.

Therefore, the Snow Basin properly was acquired by and titled in the name of

John E. Keiter in 1994 during the course of the marriage. (R. 500, Pet. Ex. 52/Res. Ex. 49,
Addendum "Q").
22.

Because of the distribution of the Snow Basin property there was a tax imposed

on the parties pursuant to their joint tax return. This tax was paid with marital earnings
(approximately $21,000). (R. 504).
23.

In 1990 in a meeting between the parties and Jay Curtis, counsel for the retirement

plan, Mr. Curtis noted that the Keiter retirement pension plan still owed $140,000 in order to
acquire unencumbered title to the Snow Basin property. Mr. Curtis would have had no way of
knowing this apart from being informed by Dr. Keiter. (R. 501).
24.

The property taxes on the Snow Basin property have been paid from his income

earned by virtue of his marital efforts and during the marriage. (R. 501).
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25.

The Respondent earned money in exchange for his surgical services and then

deposited that money into the M.D.P.C. or the personal account. He would pay for various
things out of those accounts often without regard to the business or personal character associated
with the use of those funds. In other words, Dr. Keiter would often pay personal expenses out of
the business account. (R. 502, Pet. Ex. 8, Schedules D-l, D-2 and E, Addendum "R").
26.

The Trial Court made Findings regarding Dr. Keiter's credibility which also

impacted the Court's Findings of Fact. The Court found that Dr. Keiter frequently used funds for
personal purposes but did not pay taxes on those sums and factored the Court's decision
regarding the Respondent's credibility into its overall Findings and Conclusions. (R. 502, 503,
504).
27.

When the Snow Basin property was distributed from the 1980 Keiter pension plan

upon its termination in 1994 it was valued at $110.000 and there was also a 10% tax penalty due
to the early withdrawal from the retirement plan. Therefore, taxes of approximately $21,000
were paid from joint marital funds. (R. 504, 639, p. 85).
28.

The waiver signed by the Petitioner as required by ERISA was not intended to

affect any spousal property rights. The distribution of Snow Basin to the Respondent was not
intended as a mechanism to keep the property from the Petitioner but, was, rather intended to
serve prospective tax benefits for the parties. (R. 506-507).
29.

The Snow Basin property has been improved during the marriage and after its

distribution by the cutting of rough roads (by the Petitioner's uncle, as a bartered matter); two
wells have been dug; a reservoir was built and the powerline has been "stubbed" to the property
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line. Property taxes on the Snow Basin property were paid from marital income amounting to
$43,044. (R. 508).
30.

At least $158,640 has been expended to improve and maintain the property which

sum substantially exceeds its value ($110,000) at the time it was distributed to the Respondent.
(R. 508, Pet. Ex. 64, Addendum "S"). This does not include any of the bartered services or other
improvements made during the marriage.
31.

While it is impossible to make a finding regarding the fair market value of this

property the best evidence would suggest that it is worth at least $2.39 million based upon the
2006 appraisal. Because of the inability to make a Finding about the current fair market value
the Court ordered that the property be marketed for sale and the proceeds divided equally. (R.
509, 506, 529).
32.

The Court found that when the Snow Basin property was conveyed to the

Respondent it lost its "separate character entirely." At one, temporary point the property had
some, albeit nominal, separate value because it was under contract for acquisition by the
Respondent's retirement pension plan prior to the parties' marriage. However, because it was
substantially paid for by the plan during the marriage from marital contributions to the plan any
separate character of this asset would have diminished given the length of the marriage and as
time went by. (R. 514-515).
33.

The parties Stipulated in open court during the trial that if the Respondent were to

liquidate the M.D.P.C. the parties would equally divide any proceeds after deducting legitimate
business expenses and costs. The Court specifically found that in accordance with the
Stipulation it was an equitable way to divide the value of the business. Based thereon, it was
15

unnecessary for the Court to make Findings regarding the character of the M.D.P.C. or its fair
market value for equitable division purposes. (R. 509).
34.

However, the Court made extensive Findings regarding the marital earned income

generated by the Respondent in exchange for his efforts expended during the marriage and to
what use those funds were put (paragraph 38, Memorandum Decision) (R. p. 515-518).
35.

The Court considered many equitable factors in determining the property division

including its impact on alimony when compared with the likely duration of the Respondent's
medical practice. (R. 524-525).
36.

The Court accounted for the Respondent's "separate" interest in the retirement

accounts awarding him a 22.83% separate interest therein and divided the remaining marital
retirement amount according to the "Woodward formula." Therefore, Dr. Keiter received the full
benefit of any premarital, separate interest he might have had in the retirement accounts. (R.
512-513).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
It is unnecessary to determine the marital or separate character of the Respondent's
- M.D.P.C. medical practice. Dr. Keiter's earnings during the marriage, received in exchange for
his active, marital efforts, are a marital asset as are assets acquired with those earnings. The
value of the M.D.P.C, its appreciation and other issues regarding value were resolved by the
^parties' Stipulation during the trial.
The Snow Basin real property is a marital asset. It was acquired by Dr. Keiter during the
marriage. Previously, it was owned by the defined benefit pension plan. The retirement plan was
a distinct and separate entity. There were multiple "participants" in that plan. Dr. Keiter's pre16

marital interest in the plan is accounted for in the undisputed Qualified Domestic Relations Order
(QDRO) terms which award Dr. Keiter his pre-marital interest. The plan, and then the parties,
paid the vast majority of the purchase price installments during the marriage from marital
earnings. After Dr. Keiter acquired title, during the marriage, the marital estate and Ms. Keiter
contributed money and effort to the improvement, protection and enhancement of the property
which exceeded the value of the property when Dr. Keiter obtained title.
The Appellant has failed to marshall the evidence which supports the Court's Findings
where those Findings appear to be challenged by the Appellant.
ARGUMENT
I.
IT WAS UNNECESSARY FOR THE COURT TO RULE ON THE
CHARACTER OF THE VALUE OF THE MDPC THE PARTIES' STIPULATION
RESOLVED THAT ISSUE. DR. KEITER'S EARNINGS DURING THE MARRIAGE
AND WHAT BECAME OF THEM ARE MARITAL.
The Appellant's fundamental error in his principle argument is his failure to distinguish
between the value of the M.D.P.C. and the Respondent's marital earned income. These issues
are not one and the same. The parties entered into a Stipulation which resolved the first issue.
The Appellant's "presumption" that marital earnings from a medical practice during the marriage
are separate is incorrect. The Appellant's statement that Dr. Keiter's earnings are ''necessarily
his separate property" (See, Appellant's brief page 14 fn 2) is incorrect, inconsistent with Utah
law and inequitable.
Ms. Keiter stated a claim and was prepared to establish that the M.D.P.C. was a marital
asset. Furthermore, Ms. Keiter was prepared to establish that the fair market value of the
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M.D.P.C. included the value of personal or professional goodwill. The value of the M.D.P.C.
and any of its assets, of any sort, was resolved by Stipulation as follows:
Mr. Sessions: "First with respect to the M.D. - the John E. Keiter, M.D.P.C. and the
medical practice through which that - that is conducted through that entity,
in order to reach a settlement and save some testimony and further expense
with respect to that, the parties stipulate and agree that if and when Dr.
Keiter sells his medical practice or liquidates his medical practice, after the
payment of legitimate business expenses and liabilities, any excess will be
equally received - will be equally divided between the parties."
"One other - with this reservation. In reaching this stipulation, we
are in no way indicating that the practice or the John E. Keiter, M.D.P.C.
is a marital asset. ...we are not in any way changing our position because
of this stipulation that it would impact anybody's claim to separate or
marital property with respect to other issues. Did I correctly state our
agreements?"
Mr, Green:

"Yes, and that would be a reciprocal agreement, no prejudice as to either
party's claims or defenses. This is meant to resolve the difference between
the parties."

The Court:

"...is someone still going to ask me to make a determination whether there
is a good will..."

Mr. Green:

"We are talking about a stipulation that resolves that very issue, the value
and character of the M.D.P.C."

(R. 640, p. 473-474).
As a result, the Court correctly found that it did not need to address the character of the
M.D.P.C. It is unnecessary for any Court to address the asset character of the MDPC in order to
resolve the Appellant's claim that his earnings are separate.
"Marital property is ordinarily all property acquired during the marriage and it
encompasses' all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and
from whatever source derived. Dunn v. Dunn 802 P.2d 1317-1318, (Utah Ct. App. 1990).,
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(quoting Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1988) and cases cited therein). When
valuing the marital portion of a professional corporation it is appropriate to include "...the
accounts receivable, tangible assets, and goodwill or a professional practice where includible in
the marital estate, to the extent they were accumulated during the marriage,,..." in a case where
the professional practice predates the marriage. Dunn, Supra at p. 1318. This sets up a twoprong test: 1) When was the asset acquired; and 2) What was given in exchange for the asset. An
asset acquired during the marriage (as opposed to prior to the marriage) and in consideration of
marital efforts (as opposed to inheritance or gift during the marriage) should be considered a
marital asset. Dr. Keiter's income during the marriage, generated in exchange for his efforts
during the marriage, and assets acquired with that income are marital under this test.
Furthermore, under the definition of marital property, Dr. Keiter's earnings during the
marriage are marital as are the assets acquired with those earnings.
"...A marital asset is defined functionally as any right that has accrued during the
marriage to a present or future benefit." Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 895 P.2d 835, 837 (Utah Ct. App.
1995). Therefore, "...the right to future income is a marital asset where that right is derived from
efforts or products produced during the marriage,..." Dunn v. Dunn. Supra at p. 1318 (citations
omitted). The Dunn case also establishes that "it is well settled that the present value, as well as
any deferred earnings of retirement accounts accrued during the marriage, are marital assets and,
where ever possible, should be valued as of the time of the divorce and should be equitably
divided." Dunn v. Dunn, Supra at 1319 (relying upon Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 687
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) and Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432-433 (Utah Ct. App.
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1982). From the above it is clear that a right (i.e. an asset) that "accrues" during the marriage is a
marital asset including any future benefit therefrom.
The facts of this case establish that Dr. Keiter's marital earnings and their use to acquire
assets are marital for equitable property division purposes. First of all, the Appellant himself
testified that he did not think he should get "a bigger piece of the marital assets" because he
earned the money. (R. 639 p. 79(19)). It is undisputed that Dr. Keiter earned money in exchange
for surgical procedures, that the funds would be deposited into one of the accounts that he
established, often without regard to what the Court believes was properly paid from that account.
That is, the Court found that the Respondent would often pay personal expenses from the
business account. (R. 501 p. 23). Dr. Keiter paid personal expenses out of the business account
(R. 502 p. 24). The parties filed joint tax returns and the taxes were paid from joint marital funds
(R.504). The professional, earned income was Dr. Keiter's sole source of income (R. 639 p. 162
1-13).
For purposes of this discussion, it does not matter whether Dr. Keiter's earnings during
the marriage assisted the M.D.P.C. retirement plan in its acquisition of the Snow Basin property
or whether those funds were paid directly from Dr. Keiter's accounts. To the extent that the
'retirement plan was funded during the marriage, and as soon as that occurred, Ms. Keiter
acquired an interest in the retirement plan. Woodward v. Woodward^ Supra
In apparent disregard of this authority, the Appellant states "If Dr. Keiter owns the
practice separately, than any payments from his medical practice bank account towards the Snow
Basin property are not a type of commingling." (Appellant's Brief p. 14). In other words,
payments made from the medical practice would be "separate" even if made during the marriage
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and due to Dr. Keiter's marital efforts. However, the Appellant cites no authority for the
"presumption" and his conclusion (Appellant's Brief, p. 14, fn 2).
The Appellant establishes, correctly, that the Court should categorize the parties' assets as
marital or separate, presumptively award separate property to the owner and the general
references to how separate property becomes commingled or loses its identity. However, those
cases do not support the Appellant's claim regarding income (and assets) acquired during the
marriage, in exchange for marital efforts. Obviously, the income earned by virtue of Dr. Keiter's
marital efforts does not constitute "passive" earnings or appreciation of a separate asset
II.
THE PARTIES' INTEREST IN SNOW BASIN WAS ACQUIRED DURING
THE MARRIAGE. ANY "SEPARATE" INTEREST OF THE APPELLANT IS
ACCOUNTED FOR IN THE DIVISION OF THE RETIREMENT BENEFITS
ACCORDING TO WOODWARD PRINCIPLES. THE CONSIDERATION FOR
ACQUIRING THE SNOW BASIN PROPERTY WAS MARITAL EFFORT AND
INCOME EARNED DURING THE MARRIAGE.
The Appellant's argument as to the discrete property called "Snow Basin" is flawed. This
is because the Appellant does not distinguish between himself and the retirement plan that
preexisted the marriage. It is undisputed that Dr. Keiter had a "separate" interest in that
retirement plan. However, Dr. Keiter ignores the fact that the retirement plan also has a
significant "marital" portion according to Woodward v. Woodward, Supra and its progeny.
Therefore, for a brief period of time, Dr. Keiter's interest in the retirement plan was
"separate" as the trial judge found. However, as soon as Dr. Keiter made marital contributions to
the retirement plan, that asset took on a mixed separate/marital character which calls for its
distribution according to long established Utah law. Ms. Keiter has not contested the Trial
Court's conclusion that Dr. Keiter should receive his pre-marital portion of the retirement plan.
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However, it is important in this analysis to determine the timing and source of funds used
to acquire Snow Basin under the installment purchase contract. The issue is factual. In this
regard, the Appellant has not marshalled the evidence which will support the Trial Court's
detailed Findings which establish that the Snow Basin installment purchase contract was paid, as
called for therein, during the marriage and with marital earnings.
The following four conclusions support the Trial Court's decision as to the marital
character of the Snow Basin property:
1.

Timing: This property was acquired or the interest "accrued" during the marriage

when title was obtained by Dr. Keiter from the retirement plan.
2.

Source of consideration to acquire the asset: The funds used to acquire the asset

and pay the installments under the contract came from marital earnings acquired and used during
the marriage. Some of these funds were contributed to the retirement plan.
3.

Post-transfer improvement of the property: After Dr. Keiter acquired the property

during the marriage from the retirement plan it was improved, protected and plans for its
development created by the parties jointly.
4.

Equity: The Court's treatment of the property division, alimony and Snow Basin

was equitable.
Dr. Keiter maintains that "...it is clear that Dr. Keiter acquired the Snow Basin property in
1981 prior to his marriage to Ms. Keiter." (Appellant's Brief p. 18). However, the reference
recited as the basis for this allegation is the Court's Memorandum Decision" which states:
"12. Respondent, as the trustee of the John E. Keiter MDPC, Pension and Profit Sharing plan, the
1980 plan...signed a purchase agreement in September 1981 to purchase the entire 80 acres..."
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Dr. Keiter contracted to acquire the property as trustee of the pension plan not as his property.
The Appellant later in his Brief acknowledges this fact but goes on to say that "Ms. Keiter was
never a participant" in the defined benefit plan. While this is technically correct, it is also
irrelevant. It ignores her marital equitable interest in the plan under Woodward v Woodward,
Supra which vested in her as soon as Dr. Keiter made marital contributions to the plan, which he
did. (R. 491-R. 504, Memorandum Findings 12-24). Based upon the fact that Dr. Keiter made
marital contributions to the premarital retirement plan and that these contributions were,
sometimes, used to retire the Snow Basin installment purchase contract, the Appellant's reliance
upon continuous and uninterrupted ownership is misplaced. Ownership would not vest without
making the future payments.
The transfer of ownership from the MDPC to Dr. Keiter personally, is important and
should not be minimized. This is not a "conversion from one investment medium to another"
case. (Appellant's Brief p. 18). In this case, outright ownership of the property in question was
transferred from the owner to Dr. Keiter during the marriage. In a "conversion from one medium
to another" analogy, ownership before and after the transfer would be identical. Burt v Burt, 799
P.2d 1166, (Utah Ct. App. 1990).1
Just as important is the fact that whatever separate interest Dr. Keiter had in the
retirement plan has been properly and equitably accounted for. Dr. Keiter's premarital interest in

]

It appears that the Appellant challenges the Court's Findings. At the same time he seems
to rely on them (see Appellant's Brief p. 18) One potential inference from the Brief could be
that the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the Findings As to the
Court's Findings, if they are not challenged, the reference above is in lieu of repeating those
Findings which are included in the Addendum to this Brief.
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the retirement plan was conclusively established by his prior Divorce Decree which preceded his
marriage to Dana Keiter by one month. The value of that asset was $187,000 (R. 512,
Memorandum/Finding 36).
The result is the inescapable conclusion that Dr. Keiter did not own the Snow Basin
property prior to receiving his deed in 1994. Furthermore, the only time his interest in the
property, as a result of his separate interest in the retirement account was "separate," was during
the period of time between his marriage to Ms. Keiter and the commencement of his marital
contributions.
It is important to challenge one factual statement by Dr. Keiter in his Brief, to wit: That it
is "...undisputed that Dr. Keiter purchased and made the large majority of payments on the Snow
Basin property before his marriage to Ms. Keiter." (Appellant's Brief p.20). This misstates the
Court's Findings and the evidence which supports those Findings. That issue, the timing of the
payment of the installment purchase contract, consumed a significant amount of trial time.
Likewise, the Court devotes a substantial portion of its Findings to the point. Therefore, it
appears that the Appellant is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the Court's
conclusion that the installment payments were made during the marriage. However, the
Appellant has not marshalled the evidence in order to challenge the Court's Finding. In fact, the
only reference to the record on that point is during Dr. Keiter's examination, by his own attorney
in response to a clearly leading question. While Dr. Keiter testified that he "substantially paid"
the contract prior to the marriage, that contradicts his other testimony and the weight of the
evidence. Dr. Keiter has not referenced nor attempted to marshall this evidence.
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First of all, the retirement plan did not have sufficient assets to pay off the Snow Basin
contract prior to the marriage. On January 11,1982 the plan was worth $ 187,000 one month
prior to the parties' marriage. If the contract had been paid, then it would follow that the
retirement plan would have had a value of at least equivalent to the plan's contract interest in the
land which would be $278,125. (R. 507, Pet. Ex. 58 and Pet. Ex. 105, Addendum UT" and "L").
Dr. Keiter acknowledged that he made a contribution to the retirement fund five and a half years
after the marriage for purposes of performing the installment purchase agreement. (R. 639, p.
193, line 13; Pet. Ex. 57, Addendum "J": Check number 5838 dated September 22. 1987). This
installment occurred when and in the amount prescribed by the contract. Later, when confronted
with evidence that another Snow Basin 'land contribution" had been made September 30. 1988,
six and a half years after the marriage, Dr. Keiter testified " it's a little nebulous to me, I've made
a notation in here that there was a withdrawal, and it says 'Snow Basin land contribution,' so it
could be that that's another check, but it's not a contribution if it's coming out of the retirement
trust.'* When asked why he would withdraw from the retirement plan to make a payment in 1988
on the property Dr. Keiter testified: "Well, if I did, I did, but I don't have any record of that. I am
not sure what I did there, I am not sure what it means." (R. 639, p. 194-195; Pet. Ex. 56,
Addendum U I" ). Dr. Keiter admits that the payments towards Snow Basin "came from different
accounts of mine" (R. 639, p. 197). When confronted with the lack of funds to have paid off the
Snow Basin contract prior to this marriage the Respondent testified,
"Right. As you say, the Divorce Decree [the prior divorce] is confusing. It doesn't
support that; I understand. That's a negative report, I admit, but the thing that bothers me
is nowhere in that entire Divorce Decree does the Snow Basin property receive any
attention whatsoever, and I don't understand that. We know what happened." (R. 639, p.
235-236).
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The parties estate planning counsel, Mr. Curtis, testified that there was still some
$140,000 owing on the Snow Basin property as of 1990 which corresponds with the normal
amortization schedule under the contract. (R. 501 23, R. 639 p. 55, Pet. Ex. 105, Addendum
"L"). This amounted to one or two installments and the final balloon yet to be paid. These notes
appear to have been made based upon statements from Dr. Keiter. Since transfer of the property
to Dr. Keiter, the parties expended some $158,640 in marital funds for the improvement,
protection and enhancement of the property. (R. 508, Pet. Ex. 64, Addendum "S"). Petitioner's
Exhibit 87 is a handwritten note that shows as of September 18, 1989 Dr. Keiter still owed
$187,507 and then the note shows that Dr. Keiter made "two payments in June, 1990 with a
discount of $5,875. The "Court relies and considers it [the handwritten note] as other
corroborative evidence that payments were made on Snow Basin during the marriage and that the
property was not paid off before the marriage." (R. 498, Pet. Ex. 87, Addendum "K"). This note
also corresponds with a file memorandum of Jay Curtis which indicated as of September 1990
the plan owed $140,000 (Pet. Ex. 90, Addendum "U"). That amount closely matches the
$142,864 projected due in June 1990 on the handwritten note. An amortization set forth in
Petitioner's Exhibit 105 shows that the amount of $187,500 to be due at this time would have
required only an additional $10,813 down. Last, there was a dearth of records and failure of
evidence to support the Respondent's claim that the payments were made before this marriage.
Dr. Keiter controlled all of the documents. He acknowledged that there were "a few holes in it,"
referring to his production of documents and evidence. (R. 497, 499, 639, p. 48).
Next, Dr. Keiter's reliance upon the fact that the property was titled in only his name
during the marriage and, therefore, separate is misplaced. The titling of the property in Dr.
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Keiter's name was required by the federal ERISA law. (R. 640, p. 354). The pension plan
distribution can only take place based upon and with the waiver of Dana Keiter, which ERISA
also requires. (R. 640, p. 356, 357). Ms. Keiter had a "spousal benefit" prior to the termination of
the plan and the distribution of this property to Dr. Keiter. (R. 640, p. 358). Dr. Keiter, himself,
testified that there was no significance to the termination of the old plan and the titling of Snow
Basin in his name when it came to potential property rights of either of the parties in the event of
divorce. (R. 639 p. 82) Rather, "...it wasn't even in my mind. ...No. It was just an action based
on an attorney's recommendation." (R. 639, p. 83). Based upon that the Court correctly
concluded that "it was not the intent of the Respondent to 'exclude' Petitioner in 1994 when he
transferred the Snow Basin property from the 1980 plan into his own name, he merely now views
the property as his from the time it was purchased." (R. 506, p. 24, Memorandum/Finding 28).
Likewise, the claim that the acquisition of this real property by the marital estate as
described above is in any way comparable to "inheritance and gifts" (Appellant's Eirief p. 20) is
contrary to the principles governing separate property. Not only was this property acquired
during the marriage, when it was acquired and how it was acquired was at a cost to the marital
estate. (R. 639, p. 188). The marital estate and both parties continued to improve, enhance and
augment the property afterwards. This property required payment of annual property taxes from
marital earnings. The amounts diverted from the marital estate greatly exceeded the initial value
of this property to the estate. When the property was distributed from the pension plan it was
valued at $110,000. (Pet. Ex. 48, Addendum "V") The marital estate incurred penalty and taxes
for that distribution of $21,000. (R. 504). The marital estate paid property taxes totalling
$43,044 between 1994 and 2007 (Pet. Ex. 62, Addendum "W"). The marital estate paid at least
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$158,640 towards improving the property. (Pet. Ex. 64, Addendum "S"). Thus, in total,
excluding barter and other in-kind transactions, the marital estate directly paid at least $222,685
for maintenance, enhancement, and protection of this property. In addition, given it has been
established that the property was paid off by the pension plan during the marriage, and likely
mostly in accordance with the original amortization schedule, marital earnings in excess of
$400,000 were diverted to the pension plan in order to make the payments [(($29,375 x 10) +
final balloon); lowest total per illustrations in Petitioner's Exhibit 105 is $418,375.]. The parties
jointly discussed all improvements being made to the raw land. (R. 639, p. 198). Roads, wells,
reservoirs and the establishment of property lines occurred during the marriage and after transfer
of title to Dr. Keiter. Ms. Keiter's uncle created a road on the property as a result of a barter of
labor and skill with the Keiters. Not only did the parties discuss how to use marital funds for the
improvement of the property, the parties continuously and collaboratively planned for the future
use of the property (R. 639, p. 74, p. 76, p. 197 R. 640, p. 335 p. 345).
The Court's conclusion that a showing of "commingling" was unnecessary was logical
given the Court's Findings and the supporting evidence. Whatever separate character might be
associated with this property was lost when Dr. Keiter made contributions to his pension plan
(which owned the property) during this marriage. Any "separate" interest in the retirement plan
is equitably accounted for by the Court's Order, consistent with the Woodward decision and the
Qualified Domestic Relations Order that has now been entered.
Dr. Keiter wants nothing more than to count his "separate" interest in the retirement plan
twice. First he has received and does not dispute his pre-marital portion of the retirement plan.
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However, he also wants to claim that same pre-marital interest as the basis for his arguments in
connection with Snow Basin.
It is unnecessary for Ms. Keiter to be named as a "participant" in the profit sharing plan
(Appellant's Brief p. 24). Her marital interest in the pension plan derives from her marriage to
Dr. Keiter, not her legal status as a "participant." Just the same, there were other participants in
the plan. This is another reason Dr. Keiter cannot claim that he and the plan are one and the
same. Likewise, contributions to the plan, its improvements, taxes, purchases and so forth came
from Dr. Keiter's marital earnings and therefore he can take no comfort in the fact that the plan
was the source of Snow Basin payments. (Appellant's Brief p. 24). Dr. Keiter's argument that he
"brought these accounts into the marriage" ignores the fact that the accounts were funded with
his marital earnings. Whether Ms. Keiter was authorized to sign on these accounts, which served
as the repository of marital earnings, is not dispositive.
Last, the Court correctly understood that this property division made any alimony award
unnecessary. This was particularly important in light of the fact that Dr. Keiter represented that
* he was "ramping down" his medical practice. In other words, the Court made its property
division with an eye towards the global award. The Court accounted for the division of property
and also the ability of the parties to support themselves and all of the alimony factors which
would otherwise have to be accounted for. (R. 515-518, paragraph 38). The Respondent has
failed in his attempt to show that the equitable property distribution of marital assets as ordered
by the Court is inequitable as to him.
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CONCLUSION
The Appellant's chief argument is that: 1) Dr. Keiter's medical practice is premarital and
therefore his separate asset and; 2) Therefore, all income he earned therefrom or that was on hand
at the time of the divorce is therefore his separate property. Utah law does not support this
position. Rather, Dr. Keiter's earnings, whether in the form of receivables, cash or income which
has been distributed (and used to acquire assets during the marriage) constitute a marital asset.
There is a two-fold test which establishes the marital character of earnings during the marriage
and assets acquired therewith. The first test is one of "timing." In other words, when were the
funds earned or the asset acquired? Second, there is the "consideration" test. In this case, the
earnings and assets acquired during the marriage were a direct consequence of Dr. Keiter's
marital efforts. Ms. Keiter contributed, equitably and equally, to the enterprise of the family.
Dr. Keiter's failure to distinguish between the value of the M.D.P.C. and the earnings
generated during the marriage in consideration of Dr. Keiter's efforts is his first, critical, error.
As far as the value of the medical practice is concerned (including professional goodwill)
Ms. Keiter compromised her claims that were perfected and she was prepared to prove at trial.
This is represented by the Stipulation with Dr. Keiter for the division of the proceeds from the
sale of the medical practice.
The Appellant's second argument fails because he does not distinguish between the
retirement plan owned by the professional corporation and the Snow Basin property which was
distributed to him, personally, during the marriage and at a cost to the marital estate. The
Appellant, instead, apparently argues that he and the retirement plan are all one and the same.
Again, the character of the Snow Basin property was established by the "timing" of its
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acquisition by the marital estate. In this case, the marital estate acquired ownership during the
marriage. This came at a significant financial cost to the marital estate. This cost to the marital
estate exceeded the value of the land when it was titled in Dr. Keiter's name during the marriage.
Furthermore, Ms. Keiter significantly contributed to the asset. Dr. Keiter's separate or premarital
interest in the retirement plan is fully accounted for by the Woodward QDRO. If Dr. Keiter were
awarded his separate interest in the retirement account (which owned the Snow Basin property at
the time of the marriage) together with the Snow Basin property whatever separate interest he
had in the retirement account would be counted twice.
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